


Inverting The Pyramid

The History of Football Tactics
Wilson, Jonathan



Chapter 1: FROM GENESIS TO THE PYRAMID

- 1848** - "The Cambridge Rules"
- 1862** - "The Simplest Game" was published.
- The English FA was Formed.
- 1863** - Carrying the ball by hand was outlawed.
- Discussions regarding whether or not to allow "Hacking" led to the split between Football and Rugby. Hacking (kicking the shins of an opponent) was allowed (later disallowed).
- Law 6, . . . was a forerunner to the Offside Law. It stated that when a player kicks the ball, any teammate closer to the opponent's goal is considered out of play and cannot touch the ball (or prevent an opponent from touching the ball) until he is in play.
- This made the game largely a dribbling game.
- 1866** - Change to Law 6 allowed a forward pass as long as there were at least three (3) members of the defensive team between the player and the opponent's goal when the ball was played.
- 1870s** - Goalkeeper became a recognized position. It wasn't until **1909** that he began to wear a different colored jersey.
- 1871** - A London based team traveled to Sheffield and lost 3-1. The loss was recorded as having been mainly due to the fact that the Sheffield side used an organized formation.
- 1872** - Scotland (Queen's Park) vs England.
- English players were significantly larger and more physical forcing the Scottish team to play a passing game. They played a 2-2-6 against the English 1-2-7. It worked as the heavily favored English were held to a 0-0 Draw.
- Scottish players were more accustomed to a passing game as their version of "Offside" was only called when the receiving player was beyond the last defender AND within 15 yards of goal.
- The Royal Engineers (pictured at the right in 1872) are largely known as the first team to combine a dribbling and passing game.
- 1873** - Scottish FA was formed.
- 1875** - Sheffield was more of a dribbling team (than passing), but would punt the ball forward when needed. This led to the ball being in the air and in turn, Heading.
- 1885** - The FA legalized Professionalism.
- 1880s** - Through the 1880s (with evidence of it beginning in the late 1870s), the 2-3-5 formation (**Pyramid**) became popular. Nottingham Forest and Cambridge were among the first teams to use the system.
- The Center Half became the fulcrum, . . . a multi-skilled player. He could score goals and destroy opposing attacks, a leader and an instigator, . . . the most important player on the field.



- *1878 - The Sheffield Independent reported that in an exhibition match between the Reds and the Blues, each team used four (4) Backs, a Mid and five (5) Forwards.
 - There is no evidence of any team using more than two (2) Defenders for another 3 decades.


Chapter 2: THE WALTZ AND THE TANGO

Late 1800s - The game was popping up in Austria, Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands, Sweden, etc.

- 1904** - Training at the time was mainly based on conditioning.
- Tottenham at the time trained only twice a week with the ball.
 - The reasoning at the time was: "Give a player a ball during the week and he won't be so hungry for it on Saturday."

Early 1900s - **Jimmy Hogan** (English of Irish descent), was playing professionally at Rochdale, Burnley and eventually Fulham.

- He was more concerned with technique than any coaches at the time and left Burnley because he felt the coaching was primitive.
- Hogan left Fulham (much success) after a knee injury for Swindon Town and soon after, Bolton Wanderers.



- Bolton was relegated, but a pre-season trip to the Netherlands (and a 10-0 win over Dordrecht) left Hogan vowing to return to coach. At 28, he signed a 2-year contract to manage Dordrecht.
- Hogan coached Dordrecht, improving fitness, ball control, etc. and introducing classroom talks and chalkboard lessons on tactics.
- His success led to a role managing the Dutch National side to a 2-1 win over Germany.
- After his contract ended, Hogan returned to playing at Bolton and helped them to promotion, but soon after looked to get back into coaching.

- **Hugo Meisl** (Jewish, born in Maleschau, Czech Republic), moved to Vienna at a young age. Began working at the Austrian Football federation and slowly worked his way up to Head of the federation. In an effort to prepare Austria (1912) for the Stockholm Olympics, hired Jimmy Hogan.

- The two both believed building technique, letting the ball do the work (passing), including well-directed / longer pass to unsettle opposing defenses. Meisl believed the best way to win was through keeping possession.



1916 - Jimmy Hogan was succeeded by **Dori Kurschner** (a former player of his) after war forced his departure. Kurschner made a large impact in Brazil twenty years later (see Chapter 7, Harnessing the Carnival).

Meisl continued the style Hogan had developed, but questioned it after a 5-0 loss to Southern Germany on bumpy, frozen field. The team however, was set on the style they had created. Brian Glanville (writer): “soccer became almost an exhibition, a sort of competitive ballet, in which scoring goals was no more than an excuse for the weaving of a hundred indicate patterns.”

- Late 1800’s** - Alexander Watson Hutton (Edinburgh graduate), brought the game to Argentina and was a key figure in the reformation of Argentinian Association Football League (1893). William Leslie Poole formed the Albion Cricket Club (1891) in Uruguay. The club’s Football section soon played against teams in Buenos Aires (Argentina).
- The game grew most rapidly in the slums of Argentina and Uruguay. The small, uneven spaces kids played on forced them to keep the ball close and retain possession versus developing a passing, especially a long passing game.
- 1905** - Nottingham Forrest vs a side made up of Anglo-Argentinians showed a significant difference in styles and strengthened the discussions regarding direct and possession oriented ways of playing.
- 1924** - Uruguay won the Olympics.
- 1930** - World Cup Championship. Argentina lagged behind mainly because they lacked any sense of tactics. Their played was completely based on “the joy of attacking” (Wilson). 1936 (September) - 1938 (April), there wasn’t a single scoreless draw in the Argentinian Championship.

Chapter 3: THE THIRD BACK

- 1925** - The FA considered two alterations to the Offside Law (unchanged since 1866) to increase scoring: (1) Require only two opposing players be closer to the goal than the player with the ball. (2) Add a line 40 yards from goal where any player behind that line would not be offside. The first version was used in the 1925-1926 season. The change worked and goal scoring increased from an average of 2.58 goals per game to 3.69.

- The improvement however isn’t viewed as completely positive.


Herbert Chapman’s response was to add a third back, . . . creating the “W-M” formation. The change is widely viewed as having contributed to negativity in English football and deepened the divide between players who want to win and players who want to play well. The change also led to more space for forwards and a trend away from shorter passes to longer balls.

- Harry Chapman, regarding fear of defeat and potential loss of points: “. . . if we would have better football, we must find some way of minimizing the importance of winning and the value of points.”

- Danny Blanchflower: “The great fallacy is that the game is first and last about winning; it is, . . . about glory, it is about doing things in style and with a flourish would surely not have it decided in the manner of figure skating, by a panel of judges awarding marks out of ten. It is a simple but unfortunate fact that eventually those who are looking to win games will toy with negativity.”



- 1908** - **Herbert Chapman** (coaching Northampton), was falling in league play and created a **counter-attacking** style. He encouraged his team to fall back, draw out opposing defenders and counter through open space. They ended up winning the league and scoring a record ninety goals.
- 1912** - Chapman moved to Leeds where he instituted “team-talks.”
- 1921** - After being banned and re-instated over an illegal payment (to players) scandal between 1919 and '21, Chapman became Manager at Huddersfield Town and won the FA Cup in 1922. His defensive style was exaggerated by a plan to sit his center-half even deeper. The FA wasn't impressed and the argument as to whether or not there is a “right way to play” grew.
- Chapman also encouraged “inside passing,” the concept of building though the middle instead of playing wide, down the flanks and crossing in front of the goal.
 - Chapman became (in England, at least), the first modern Manager. He had control of tactics, signings, . . . all the way down to what records would be played in the stadium during games.
- 1925** - Chapman took the job at Arsenal and signed Charlie Buchan (Sunderland) for £2,000 + £100 for each goal he scored that next season. Sunderland made £4,100 in the end.
- The change in the Offside Law led to the dropping of the #5 into the back line, and although Arsenal wasn't the first to do this, they were the first to drop the Inside Right (#8) back into the Midfield, . . . creating a 3-3-4.
- 1930** - Arsenal won their first trophy with Chapman (in the 5 year timeline he promised).
- Full-Backs marked Wingers (vs Inside Forwards), Wing-Halves covered opposing Inside Forwards (vs Wingers), . . . the Center Half was now a Center-Back and dealt with the opposing Center-Forward, . . . both Inside Forwards dropped deeper bending the Forward line.




- "We at Arsenal achieved our end by deliberately drawing on the opponents by retreating and funneling to our own goal, holding the attack at the limits of the penalty box and then thrusting quickly away by means of long passes to our wingers."

- Bernard Joy

Chapter 4: HOW FACISM DESTROYED THE COFFEE HOUSE

1939 - The FA made jersey numbers compulsory and regulated which positions would wear each number.



1950s - Peter Doherty (Doncaster Rovers) used to switch numbers of his players to make it tougher for opponents to stay with their mark, being used to the strict numbering system. Hungary defeated England 6-3 in 1953 while doing the same thing.

1920s - into the 1930s, British fans of the game in the public schools and among the working class, . . . discussed in the pubs. In Central Europe, the game was discussed in the coffee houses, more of an upper middle class game, played by the working class, but supported by intellectuals.

- **Josef Uridil** became the first star of the game. He had a song written about him in 1922, began advertising products and was featured in a movie, as himself in 1924.

1926 - Matthias Sindelar was given his international debut (age 23), by Hugo Meisl.

1930s - With Sindelar, Uridil and Josef Smistik, created the core of the *Wunderteam* that played with such fluidity the style became known as “the Danubian Whirl.”

The chapter continues with:

- More background information on Jimmy Hogan
- 1932 Austria vs. England (4-2 to England)
 - Roland Allen (*Evening Standard*): “When the Austrians have learned how to turn all their cleverness into something that counts; when, . . . they have organized the winning of football matches as highly as they have organized the taming of a football, they will make everyone sit up and notice.”
- 1936 Austria vs England (Austria victorious)

- **Vittorio Pozzo** (Italy), Track star turned Footballer, worked his way through the Italian Football Federation and was asked to lead the Italian team in the 1912 Olympics. After leaving and returning in 1929, he took over the Italian side again, this time for 20 years, creating one of the best teams of all time.
 - Created a **W-W** or **2-3-2-3**
 - He spoke out against Win Bonuses, and the negative effects a “win-at-all-costs” focus would create.
 - He was one of the first coaches to use **man-marking**, . . . pushing tactics forward, now focusing not only on your own team, but stopping your opponent.

1934 - World Cup Semi-Final, Italy vs Austria pitted Pozzo against Meisl and is remembered as a highly physical match putting into question how far a team should be willing to stoop for victory. Italy went on to win the World Cup.

1938 - Italy wins the World Cup again, with a significant focus on defense.

- Jean Eskenazi (French Journalist): “How shall we play the game? As though we are making love or catching a bus?”

The chapter concludes touching on:

- German Football in 1920s-40s, Jimmy Hogan’s influence, the “Spinning Top” (der Kreisel) of Schalke 04 created by **Gustav Wieser** (Austrian) described by Defender Hans Boremann saying: “. . . it was not the man with the ball, but those out of possession running into space who determined the direction of their attacks.”
- Sindelar’s death and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the event.

Chapter 5: ORGANIZED DISORDER

1890s - The game first began being organized in Russia.

1936 - The first national league in Russia was established.

1937 - Spartak played in a W-M and was the only Russian club that could compete with a Basque side touring through the country to raise awareness of the Basque during the Spanish Civil War.

- The Basque style included longer passes, heading the ball and play in the flanks)

- Boris Arkadiev managed Dinamo Moskow. He grew up playing / coaching football and teaching Fencing (where he learned the value of counter-attacking).

1940 - Arkadiev spent a two hour session teaching tactics during a pre-season camp. He created a W-M with a roaming Forward that ran at angles to make it difficult for opponents to follow him.



- As the chapter continues:

- Players were instructed to interchange positions. When opponents used man-marking to slow them, Arkadiev urged his players to interchange even more (“Organised Disorder”).

- Man-marking at the time referred to the difference between zonal marking in a 2-3-5 to an awareness of who is marking who based on the jersey numbering system when teams playing a W-M matched up.

- Arkiedev was turning his 3-2-2-3 (W-M) into a 4-2-4 and some believe Arkadiev was the first coach to use a flat back four.

- He also created the short-passing game, known as “passovotchka.”

1943 - Arkadiev left Dinamo for CDKA (later CSKA), winning five championships before the team was disbanded by Stalin because he believed they were responsible for the USSR’s loss to Yugoslavia (1952 Olympics).

As the chapter closes:

- Mikhail Yakushin (replaced Arkiadev at Dinamo): “The principle of collective play is the guiding one in Soviet football. A player must not only be good in general; he must be good for the particular team.”

Chapter 6: THE HUNGARIAN CONNECTION

Wilson opens the chapter discussing “thinking,” as a side of the game that hadn’t been developed as players previously relied on physical attributes. He describes Sindelar as a smart, skillful #9 compared to the stereotype English #9, . . . strong, brave, . . . unthinking.

1948 - Marton Bukovi (Coach of MTK) flipped the W, of the W-M, to an M by dropping the #9 into the midfield allowing the two Wingers (along with the Inside Forwards) to help create a front 4.

- Nandor Hidegkuti palyed the withdrawn #9 position for Hungary, Ferenc Puskas described him by saying: “He was perfect for the role, sitting at the front of midfield, making telling passes, dragging the opposition defence out of shape and making fantastic runs to score himself.”

- Puskas and Sandor Kocsis, . . . two up top.

1953 - Hungary numbered players as reading them across the field, not the way they typically were at the time. This confused English players in 6-3 win at Wembley. Hungarian Tactics were judged to be the difference in the game.

1954 - Hungary lost to West Germany in the World Cup Final when they struggled to play on a muddy field, and West Germany man marked Hidegkuti out of the game.

1920s - **Bela Guttmann** bounced around between clubs and played for Hungary in the 1924 Olympics. He even played for the New York Giants from 1926 to 1932 (when the U.S. league fell apart) before returning home to start a coaching career.

- Guttmann survived periods of war (losing his brother in a concentration camp).

- As a coach, he often ran away from interference from Directors and conflict with players. He resigned when a Director would interfere with team selection. He simply quit at Kispest after a player played the second half despite Guttman directing him not to return to the game.

- He coached at Triestina and Padova in Italy, Boca and Quilmes in Argentina, . . . coached in Cyprus, at AC Milan, . . . later moved to Vicenza, . . . was eventually put back in charge at Kispest (now called Honved) and in 1957 was coaching at Sao Paulo. He helped Porto overtake Benfica, then was signed by Benfica and won the league in 1960 and 1961, even winning a European Championship over Barcelona.

- One week after the final, he gave Eusebio his debut.

- Soon after, he left Benfica over a “bonus” dispute when they made no effort to compensate him for winning the European title.

- The story goes, he cursed Benfica when he left and said they would never win another European Championship until they paid him what he was due. They’ve been to five finals since, . . . losing all five.



Chapter 7: HARNESSING THE CARNIVAL

1894 - Charles Miller (English Father / Brazilian Mother) left Brazil for an education in England and, as legend has it, brought two footballs with him upon his return to Sao Paulo.

- Soon after, Oscar Cox brought the game back to Rio de Janeiro, after studying abroad in Switzerland.

1902 - Sao Paulo had a successful league.

1912 - **The Scottish Wanderers** (Scottish players in Sao Paulo) played using a “pattern-weaving” style that became known as “Systema Ingleza.”

- Archie McLean left for Sao Bento where he and Bill Hopkins’ style of short passes was labeled “Tabelinha” (the little chart).

Continuing through the chapter:

- **Harry Welfare** (Liverpool), while teaching in Rio de Janeiro, shared how to play a through ball, a feint the English called “swerving” and a move where a player dribbling jumps to the other side of the ball.

- Brazilian players had differing views on showing off, falling in line with society’s views, . . . even following laws that led to views of them as great players, but undisciplined.

- Gilberto Freyre (Sociologist) wrote in 1938: “Our style of playing football contrasts with the Europeans because of a combination of the qualities or surprise, malice, astuteness and agility, and at the same time brilliance and individual spontaneity . . . our passes . . . our dummies . . . our flourishes with the ball, the touch of dance and subversiveness that marks the Brazilian style . . . seem to show psychologists and sociologists in a very interesting way the roguery and flamboyance of the mulatto that today is every true affirmation of what is Brazilian.”

1919 - A Brazilian style was well defined by one that focuses on self-expression over team play, an allowance to shoot from anywhere basing merit on whether or not the shot is on target instead of how close to goal it was taken, etc.

- Winning the Copa America, with attention to defense allowed them to see how important it was to have a structured shape.

1930 - Brazil was viewed in the World Cup as “individually cleverer, collectively inferior.” - Brain Glanville

The chapter continues with:

- Discussion of **Gentil Cardoso** who first instituted a W-M formation at Sirio Libanes, where Leonidas came from.

1937 - Dori Kürschner (known in Brazil as Kruschner) was European, understood Danubian football and could be linked to Jimmy Hogan, . . . was brought on to manage Flamengo.

- His W-M was actually more closely related to a W-W (like Vittorio Pozzo’s “Metodo”).
- Brazil in the 1938 World Cup dropped their Inside Forwards behind the attacking Center-Half, creating the “Point of the Lance” (ponta da lanca) among the three players. Kürschner was working as an advisor to coach Adhemar Pimenta.



After Kürschner left Flamengo:

- Flavio Costa altered the W-M by instituting what he called “the diagonal.” This was the act of simply pushing the square made of the 2-2 (in the 3-2-2-3) slightly, making it more of a parallelogram. The Right-Half became a Defensive Midfielder (Volante), with the Left-Half slightly more advanced, the Right-Inside-Forward played a little deeper allowing the Inside-Left to move into a more advance position (ponta da lanca). This is why the #10 became known as the “Playmaker” (instead of the #8).

1950 - Wilson spends the next few pages breaking down the disappointing 1950 World Cup (in Brazil). Zizinho blamed the loss on the W-M formation, . . . highlighting defensive problems, generally agreed on as a Brazilian weakness.

1954 - Brazil went out in the World Cup Quarter-Final to Hungary.

Here, Wilson discusses:

- Who first introduced the 4-2-4?
 - Fleitas Solich (Paraguay), with Flamengo, winning Carioca (Rio de Janeiro) titles in 1953, 1954, 1955.
 - Martim Francisco coached at Vila Nova (near Belo Horizonte) in 1963, used a fourth Defender (quarto Zagueiro). They attacked in a 3-3-4 and defended in a 4-3-3.
 - Zeze Moreira, while a Fluminense (1951) instituted a form of zonal marking.
 - Before 1958, Brazilian football also brought back the ponta da lanca, right before the introduction of Pele at Santos, sixteen years old.

1957 - Guttman, in charge of Sao Paulo, was pushing rapid passing (“tat-tat-tat” and “ping-pang-pong”) as well as long balls into the Center Forward for flick ons to Wingers.

1958 - Vicente Feola, Guttman’s assistant at Sao Paulo, took over after Guttman left, and was named national team coach ahead of the World Cup.

- Feola was so relaxed he was rumored to sometimes fall asleep on the bench.

- Feola had female hotel staff replaced where Brazil stayed to minimize distractions, brought a doctor, a dentist, a psychologist, a trainer and a “spy” to gather information on opponents.

Wilson closes the chapter:

- Detailing the 1958 and 1962 World Cups.
- Discussing the roles of Garrincha, Zagallo, Pele, etc.
- Comparing England and Brazil, . . . Mazzoni (A Gazeta): “English football well played is like a symphonic orchestra; well played Brazilian football is like a hot jazz band.”
- By the time the 1966 World Cup came around, the W-M was history.

Chapter 8: THE ENGLISH PRAGMATISM

- Early 1950s**
- Tottenham Hotspur was the first team to begin building from the back, . . . they were the most likely to start this as they had a history for preferring a close passing game.
 - **Stan Cullis** managed Wolves from 1948 - 1964
 - In 1954, watered the field before playing Honved to slow his opponent.
 - The plan worked as the field fell apart and turning an early two goal Honved lead into a late comeback and 3-2 win for Wolves. Physique against technique.
 - For Cullis, there was no “right way” to play, his objective was to win.
 - He even dismantled Hungary’s 1953 win over England by sharing:
 - One of Hungary’s goals came from a move starting in their own half.
 - Three goals came from one pass, one from two passes and one from a Free Kick.
 - **Charles Reep** recorded attacks during the second half of Swindon vs Bristol Rovers (1950) and figured attacks have a 99.29% failure rate. He also found two of every nine goals came from more than three passes. He added a long pass from a team’s own half made a move more effective. Additionally, he found it took approximately eight chances on goal to produce a goal.
- 1953-1967**
- Bernard Benjamin of the Royal Statistical Society studied 578 games (including three World Cups), finding only 5% of moves consist of four or more passes and only 1% included six or more. He argued the longer the sequence, the more likely it was to fall apart. Reep concluded possession football was counter-productive and at a low level.
 - Charles Hughes was the FA Technical Director in the 1980s and came to similar conclusions.
 - Wilson questions the statistics arguing that by the numbers, moves of three passes or less are less effective than moves of four passes or more. He adds, this does “not even take into account the goals scored when long chains of passes have led to a dead ball” situation. He also considers the accumulate tiring of opponents who chase the ball, but is most bothered by the fact that such misinterpretations became he “cornerstone of English coaching.”
- 1955**
- Alf Ramsey took over at Ipswich and by December had pulled Jimmy Leadbetter back from a Left-Winger into the Midfield, creating space on the left side of the field for

Center-Forward Ted Phillips to go into. With the addition (1957) of Ray Crawford and Roy Stephenson, Ramsey had created a 4-2-4 that resembled the 4-3-3 Brazil would play in 1962.

- Ramsey: "We believe in striking quickly from the defence. A team is most vulnerable when it has just failed in attack. If I had to suggest an ideal number of passes, I would say three."

1962 - Ramsey was appointed England Manager. He demanded complete control of team selection and planned to experiment tactically.


1964 - England toured the Americas beating the U.S. 10-0 heading to South America for a four-team tournament. They lost 5-1 to Brazil, tied Portugal and lost 1-0 to Argentina, allowing the Argentines to win the event. Despite being beaten by intelligent play, England left feeling they hadn't tried hard enough or "shown enough pride in the badge."

- Ramsey realized the 4-2-4 was good for beating lesser teams, but not good enough for competition against stronger teams.

- He began practicing in a 4-3-3, against the England Under-23s, then tried it in a 1-0 win over West Germany and earned a 2-1 result over Sweden.

1966 - Ramsey used a lopsided 4-3-3 in a 0-0 draw with Uruguay to open the World Cup. England beat Mexico (2-0) with the skew reversed before beating France by the same score.

- The quarter-final against Argentina saw Ramsey turn to a 4-1-3-2, and Hurst headed home the only goal of the match. Two goals from Bobby Charlton helped England beat Eusebio's Portugal side, and despite halving England's lead in extra-time of the final, West Germany gave up a fourth the Hurst and England won the World Cup.



Post 1966 - Ramsey's style based on the notion: "I'm employed to win football matches. That's all" became tougher for England fans, especially after going out to West Germany in the 1970 quarter-final, losing at home to West Germany in 1972 and failing to qualify for the 1974 World Cup. Ramsey was let go.

Chapter 9: THE BIRTH OF THE NEW

"The dribbling technique of Garrincha or Stanley Matthews doesn't exist in today's game, not because the skills have been lost, but because no side would ever give them the three or four yards of acceleration room they needed before their feints became effective . . . It is that diminution of space, that compression of the game - pressing, in other words - that marks out modern football from old." - Wilson

1964 - **Viktor Maslov** ("Grandad," for wisdom, kindness) took over Dynamo Kiev after playing (1930s and '40s) and coaching at Torpedo and Rostov in the years that followed.

- Trusting of his players, willing to discuss and even compromise. Twice during his career, he let players on the field overrule his effort to substitute a player, . . . each time it worked. He would devise his game plan the night before a match, after consulting with the team.

- Despite being kind, he was also strict in his player selection selling players who did not fit in his system, . . . including **Lobanovskyi**.

- Lobanovskyi held the ball for too long for Maslov's appreciation.

- Maslov is credited with inventing the 4-4-2.

As the chapter continues:

- Discussion of Andriy Biba (first touch, change of direction) and Yurie Avrutsky (playmaker).

1966+ - Maslov was using zonal marking and developing it over the previous couple years. With Biba given freedom to create, Maslov needed a player in a more defensive role. Vasyl Turyanchyk became the first “Holding Midfielder” in the soviet game. This adjustment gave Dynamo freedom to begin “hunting in packs” (Wilson) in areas of the field previous teams didn’t try to win the ball back in. The Moscow press was appalled by the style of play.

- Maslov recognized the physical demands of players pressing properly and trained his players with this in mind.


- Nikolai Morozov introduced “zonal marking” to the USSR national side, but it was considered a failure.

- In preparation for the World Cup, Morozov’s system allowed so many goals in friendlies he became very conservative and entered the tournament with five defenders (a back four with a Sweeper behind). This adjustment got them to the Semi-Final, their best result ever.

- Dynamo championships in 1966, '67 and '68 (under Maslov) quieted critics of zonal defending and pressing.

- Maslov was also well known to change his approach to games depending on the opponent, which was very uncommon at the time. His 4-4-2 also allowed for significant interchange of positions.

- Dynamo fell to 7th in 1970 and Maslov was let go, despite not having all his players available during a World Cup year.



Chapter 10: CATENACCIO

Catenaccio: “Chain,” . . . as in to chain (lock) a door shut.

Early 1930s - Karl Rappan was a Player / Manager for Servette in Switzerland (early 1930s). His team, being semi-professional, could not match the fitness of fully professional teams. He wanted to guide a team with tactical discipline while allowing freedom of thought and action. He created what was later named the “Verrou” (Bolt). He altered a 2-3-5 by dropping Wing- Halves back to flank Defenders. The two Defenders were now Center Defenders who covered each other while the other would press on the left (or vice versa). That covering Defender was a spare Defender labeled a “Verouller,” . . . or later, the “Liberio.”

1945 - Krylya Sovetov Kuibyshev (now called Samara) earned promotion to the top league in Russia using a tactic called the “Volga Clip,” coming from the W-M, a Half-Back dropped deep to allow the Defensive Center-Half to drop and sweep from behind the Full-Backs.

- Alexander Kuzmich Abramov (Gymnastics Coach) led the team with this tactic and spent time in training on coordination, sometimes going an hour in training without players touching a ball.

- His tactics (also including zonal marking) gradually became accepted in Russia although it was viewed as a plan smaller teams would employ to compete with better sides.

1946 - Giuseppe "Gipo" Viani claims to have created "Catenaccio" after watching fishermen drag in a net of fish followed by a second (reserve) net meant to catch any fish slipping through the first. This is when he realized he needed a reserve Defender sitting behind his line of Defenders.

- He coached Salernitana to sit deep encouraging their opponents to commit numbers and become vulnerable to a counter-attack. This tactic (becoming known as the Vianema), made Catenaccio popular. He was able to help Salernitana to promotion in 1947.

1953 - Alfredo Foni used Catenaccio with Inter to win back to back Scudetti, allowing people to begin viewing the tactic as one not just for lesser sides to compete with better teams, but a way for larger teams to win trophies.

- Gino Armano (Right Wing) covered the opposing Left Wing to allow Ivano Blazon (Right-Back) to play the Sweeper role. Armano is known as the first "Tornanti" (Returner), . . . a Winger who falls back to help defend. Blazon became known as a "Battitore Libero" (Free Hitter), because he would hack players and kick the ball away, out of bounds even.

- The position later became known simply as "Libero" (Free) when players there became more sophisticated and less likely to hit opponents and just kick the ball away.



1959 - Nereo Rocco replaced Viani (after he suffered a heart attack) in charge of AC Milan. Viani stayed on as sporting director and convinced Rocco of the positives of using a Sweeper. Rocco was a known to demand all his players (even Forwards) to defend upon losing the ball and employed his own form of Catenaccio. His style was also more attacking though (scoring 83 goals in the 1961-62, Scudetto winning season vs Inter winning the Scudetto in 1953 with just 46 goals).

1960 - Helenio Herrera, moved to Inter after leading Barcelona to league championships in 1959 and 1960 scoring 96 goals (in 30 games) and 86 goals respectively.

- In 1945, Herrera claims to have created the Sweeper while playing as a Left-Back. He instructed his Left-Wing to come back into his position allowing Herrera to provide cover for the defensive line.

- The greatest compliment (in his belief) he ever received was that "he worked 30 hours a day." He was a fan of positive self-talk, was very superstitious, like to motivate players through slogans and connections to a club's history, regulated players' sleep and more. he was even rumored to have given players performance enhancing drugs.

- Herrera was a strict disciplinarian and provided detailed game plans based on thorough descriptions of opposing players' tendencies. He was viewed as a coach who emphasized fitness and psychology like no coach before him.

- In 1961, Herrera was quoted: "I took out a midfielder and put him sweeping behind the main Defenders, liberating the Left-Back to attack, . . . in attack, all the players knew what I wanted: vertical football at great speed, with no more than three passes to get to the opponent's box."

Chapter 11: AFTER THE ANGELS

Catenaccio: "Chain," . . . as in to chain (lock) a door shut.

1929 - Renato Cesarini returned home to play for Juventus and won five straight Serie A titles. Juve was developing Metodo (Method) at the same time Pozzo was with the Italian national team, and Cesarini was often given the role of man-marking an opponent's most creative player.

- Cesarini brought with him the Metodo when he returned to Argentina in the 1930s. He was dropping front line five players deeper than coaches using a W-M. In Argentina however, teams were dropping their #4 to Right-Back. When things went the way of 4-2-4, the #6 was dropped back to the center of defense.



* The Swiss Verrou was the same as above except the #6 and #3 are switched.

1941 - Cesarini coached River Plate (until 1947). They became known as "La Maquina" (the Machine) and were well known as the greatest exponents of "La Nuestra" (Ours). River was described by opponents as the type of team players would rather sit in the stands and watch instead of play against. They played attractive soccer, but sometimes to a fault. They had fun in the midfield, kept the ball with no rush to attack. They were considered the best team in the league from 1941-1945, but only won the league three times.



1958 - Argentina went out of the World Cup, describing themselves as having struggled against European sides who played much quicker than they were used to. Jose Ramos Delgado described his side as: ". . . good on the ball, but we didn't go forward."

- Jimmy McIlroy of Northern Ireland described Argentina saying they were: ". . . a lot of little fat men with stomachs, smiling at us and pointing and waving at girls in the crowd,"

- Fans threw coins and vegetables at the team when they arrived home. La Nuestra and Metodo were railed against and viewed as outdated.

1961 - Vicente Feola took over Boca Juniors and deployed Orlando (Brazil) as a "Caged #6," playing in defense instead of the midfield.

1962 - Feola was replaced by Jose D'Amico who used a 4-3-3 with the Winger Alberto Gonzalez tracking back into the midfield to give them four while defending. After winning the league title that year, the focus on defending became more intense. By 1964, Boca

won the league allowing just 15 goals in 30 games (6 in the final 25 games) and scoring only 35.

- 1966** - Juan Carlos Lorenzo was named Argentina's Head Coach for the World Cup after coaching them through the 1962 tournament. He tried to implement a Catenaccio system, but gave up on it before '62. In 1966, he used a 4-3-1-2 with a midfield diamond.
- 1967** - The changes in Argentina's play since 1958 also included a movement toward more violence, shown clearly in the Intercontinental Cup Final between Racing and Celtic. Celtic had three players thrown out and Racing had two ejected that night. Racing won and players were gifted new cars, . . . Celtic fined their players.


- 1968** - Osvaldo Zubeldía led Estudiantes to a Libertadores Championship by employing a style labeled by others as "anti-futbol."

- At Estudiantes from 1965 to 1970, Zubeldía influenced play across the country.
- Known as a student of the game who "would look at the law, and he would stand right there on the border of it" - Antonio Rattín
- He loved teaching, spending time working with his players. His teams claim to have trained harder and focused on detail more than other teams. They went into detail for Free Kicks, Throw-Ins, Corners, etc. and had secret signs and language to draw opponents into traps.
- Pressing in a 4-3-3 with an aggressive Offside Trap, with such attention to detail was a complete rejection of La Nueva.
- Estudiantes were known to be quite violent, pulling shirts, feigning being struck, even having been rumored to bring pins onto the field to jab opponents or learn about opposing players' private lives to use psychological attacks.
- Later in 1968, Estudiantes beat Manchester United in a brutal two game Final of the Intercontinental Cup. The match cemented the rivalry between England and Argentina that began with England's Quarter-Final win in the 1966 World Cup.



- 1970** - After fans saw a televised Estudiantes win over AC Milan, following Argentina's failure to qualify for the World Cup in Mexico, backlash against the violent nature of play in Argentina grew. Aguirre Suarez, Alberto Poletti and Eduardo Manera were sentenced to thirty days in jail for "disgracing a public spectacle" based on their behavior in the match.

- 1973** - César Luis Menotti coached Huracan to a Metropolitano Championship playing an attractive style of the game more comparable to La Nueva. Their play included one-touch moves, nutmegs, sombreros, one-twos, overlaps, etc. and was often so much fun to watch, opposing fans would applaud.
- Menotti was put in charge of the national team after the 1974 World Cup and stayed in charge through the 1982 Tournament, (winning in 1978).



Chapter 12: TOTAL FOOTBALL

- 1915** - Jack Reynolds immigrated to the Netherlands in 1915 and had three significant spells in charge of Ajax between then and 1947.
- He was a disciplinarian who pushed technique and encouraged players to spend time with the ball. He spent long days to make certain every team in the Ajax system played the same style.
 - He felt “attack, is and remains the best form of defence.”
- 1945** - Rinus Michels began to work with Jack Reynolds.
- 1948** - England beat The Netherlands 8-2, . . . the Dutch were still playing in a 2-3-5.
- 1954** - Began a period of limited professionalism in the Netherlands. This meant the earliest teachers of the game in the country were not pressured to win championships.
- 1959** - Vic Buckingham took over at Ajax and enhanced the club with his style. As a player, he played for Tottenham in the same team as Arthur Rowe.
- “Possession football is the thing, not kick and rush.”
 - “If you’ve got the ball, keep it. The other side can’t score.”
 - Buckingham won the Dutch League playing in a very fluid W-M (1960).
- 1965** - Buckingham was replaced at Ajax by Rinus Michels. The team was struggling near relegation and Rinus’ first effort was to change the team spirit.
- His next steps included ensuring all players were full professionals so they could commit to training, a heavy focus on technical skills and a with to a 4-2-4.
- 1966** - Amsterdam was known as the capital of the youth rebellion. The Dutch were demonstrating and rioting over holiday pay, the wedding of their princess (Beatrix) to a German aristocrat, etc. to the point inquiries into riots led to the dismissal of the Mayor and Chief of Police. Authorities came to the conclusion the best way to deal with rebellion was to tolerate it. With that and the focus on art in the city (the same place John Lennon and Yoko Ono held a week long “bed-in” after their marriage), . . . it became the perfect place for the development of Johan Cruyff.
- The Dutch became known as artistic players with allowance for individual creativity.
- Michels began to build Ajax focusing at first on defending. They won four championships between 1966 and 1970, and even were European Cup Finalists in 1969 (to AC Milan).
- The loss AC Milan pushed Michels to strengthen the midfield by altering his 4-2-4 to a 4-3-3 and encouraged Vasovic to get out of the back when attacking (creating a 3-4-3). Aggressive defenders are still very much a part of the Dutch style and in combination with “pressing” as a tactic, the style is highly effective.
 - Pressing and interchange of positions became staples of Ajax’s style.
 - “We could play 60 minutes of pressing. I’ve never seen any other club anywhere who could do that.” - Sjaak Swart
 - “You make space, you come into space. And if the ball doesn’t come to you, you leave this space and another player will come into it.” - Barry Hulshoff



- 1971** - Stefan Kovacs managed Ajax from 1971 to 1975 while Michels was at Barcelona and with the Dutch national team.
- Michels at Barcelona (since 1973), had the team playing in a 4-3-3, also using interchange of positions as a key tactic.
 - Kovacs and Michels were significantly different in demeanor. Michels' discipline had challenged players at Ajax, yet players say Kovacs' kind demeanor allowed players to get away with too much and a lack of discipline cost them championships at the end of his tenure with Ajax.
 - Ajax won European Championships in 1971, 1972 and 1973
- 1974** - The term "Totaalvoetbal" was used to describe the style of play used by the Dutch National Team (during the World Cup, under Michels). "Totaal" was being used as a prefix for Architecture, Urbanization, Environment, Energy and so on.
- Cruyff justified the use of Holland's "Offside Trap" by clarifying that pressing prevented opponents enough time to clip a ball behind them, into the space created by a high line of defense.
 - David Winner (Author of *Brilliant Orange*) claims the Dutch are "adept at the manipulation of space because of the way their flat, frequently flooded landscape forces them to manipulate space in everyday life."

Chapter 13: SCIENCE AND SINCERITY

- 1963** - Valeriy Lobanovski was studying Engineering in the U.S.S.R. This was a period of technological breakthroughs in the Soviet Union and his studies led Lobanovski to create a systematic style of coaching. He viewed the game as two subsystems, each of eleven elements, in a defined area, subject to restrictions.
- 1968** - Playing for Shakhtar, Lobanovski finished 14th in the league (Viktor Maslov led Dynamo to a third straight title that year). The frustration led to Lobanovski's retirement as a player as we has unable to come to terms with how the game was played.
- 1969** - Offered the coaching job at Dnipro Dnipropetrovsk, Lobanovski had a chance to implement ideas he believed would be the future of the game.
- 1972** - Lobanovski met Anatoliy Zelentsov, a bioenergetics specialist. The two of them often met with then Manager of Shakhtar, Oleh Bazylevych.
- 1973** - Lobanovski moved to Dynamo. He modeled playing systems for the club, Zelentsov was in charge of preparing players, Bazylevych coached the team, and Mykhaylo Oshemkov was charged with collecting statistical data.
- Dynamo was capable of pressing or dropping off and countering.
 - The central philosophy was, in possession keep the playing space as large as possible, . . . while out of possession, make the field small.
 - 14 Defensive Tasks (including distribution upon winning the ball, etc.)
 - 13 Demands on Forwards (including pressing, regaining possession, etc.)
 - 20 Coalition Actions (including an Offside Trap, Overlapping Runs, etc.)
 - Attacking and Defending was based not on position, but who was in possession, . . . meaning Forwards defended and Defenders attacked.
 - Lobanovski called this "Universality."
 - Compare to Dutch Total Football.



- Lobanovski's players were coached to "fulfill the coach's demands first, and only then perform his individual mastery." "Don't think! I do the thinking for you. Play!"
- Lobanovski's teams were very fit, but eventually exhausted.

- 1978** - Eduard Malofeev, a Forward capped 40 times for the U.S.S.R. took over as coach of Dinamo Minsk.
- His style he described as "honest." He wanted no barging or bumping or intentionally hurting an opponent, . . . no paying of Referees for results. He wanted to attack and play "pure" Football. "Football of the heart, not the head." Where Lobanovski was a coach by mathematics, Malofeev was a romantic.

As the chapter continues:

- Wilson details the career of Alexander Prokopenko and when it paralleled Malofeev's period at Dinamo.
 - Prokopenko was a highly talented creative player, but struggled with alcoholism that worked when his team struggled.
- 1984** - Malofeev took over the U.S.S.R. National Side (after Lobanovski was let go), just ahead of the '84 Olympics.
 - During World Cup Qualifying for the 1986 Tournament in Mexico, the U.S.S.R. was struggling and Malofeev was replaced, . . . by Lobanovski.
- 1986** - The U.S.S.R. had a successful World Cup, but went out 4-3 to Belgium in what is remembered as one of the greatest World Cup matches of all time.
- 1988** - Lobanovski led the U.S.S.R. to a Euro Final beating Holland, England and Italy along the way.
 - He was let go after a disappointing 1990 World Cup and left the country to coach in the Middle East.
- 1996** - Lobanovski returned to coach Dynamo, . . . just in time to work with Shevchenko. The pinnacle of their success was a 1999 Champions League Semi-Final run.

Chapter 14: FLY ME TO THE MOON

- 1970** - Brazil won the World Cup within a year of the United States putting men on the moon. Wilson draws parallels between the two events, the most significant being the fact that they were the first events televised around the world (and Brazil vs Italy in color). The number of people that saw the events unfold live was significantly larger than audiences before.
- From 1962 to 1970, the U.S. raced to put someone on the moon. Brazil won the World Cup in 1962, but after realizing their shortfall in physical preparation in 1966, the Brazilian Military was brought in to help prepare players for 1970. Uniforms were redesigned to not be weighed down by sweat, handmade boots were made for players, diet and sleep was controlled, etc.
 - The late 1960s was a period in Brazil of post war economic boom, a rise in consumerism, an influx of migration and even political support for the game. It was a situation that allowed Brazil to rise to the level it did.
- 1969** - João Saldanha coached the team in World Cup preparation, and blew through qualification. However an October trip to Europe left him uneasy about "brutal" play and "lenient" Referees. After the World Cup Draw put Brazil in a group with England, Romania and Czechoslovakia, he altered his squad to focus more on physicality. The changes led to poor play, a warm-up match loss to Argentina (March 1970), political

pressure, his lashing out at Pelé and flare-ups of his well known temper. Even after a win over Argentina in their second match, his position was terminated.

1970 - After Dino Sani and Oto Gloria refused the job before Mario Zagallo accepted.

- Zagallo brought in the best players regardless of political opinion, who played together, etc. He also went on a fact finding mission to visit NASA to study the best fitness preparation.

- Gerson, Carlos Alberto and Pelé were the team's Senior Sub-Committee (known as the Cobras). They were there to advise Zagallo. They even chose the starting line-up after a poor performance in a warm-up game.

- The conditions in Mexico (high altitude, heat, etc.) made Pressing impossible. This slowed the game and allowed players space, . . . the perfect situation for Brazil's style of play.



1974 - Zagallo was let go after a 4th place finish in the World Cup, despite injuries to Gerson, Tostão and Clodoaldo, . . . as well as the retirement of Pelé.

1978 - Coutinho was a proponent of "Polyvalence," best compared to Total Football, but for the World Cup, he prepared a plan based on physical preparation and "brutality." Brazil finished 3rd that year.

1982 - Telê Santana led the team in a style allowing them to as Wilson put it: "get on with it." They did however lack quality in the wide areas of the field. They played in a 4-2-2-2, which never caught on outside that World Cup, but suited Brazil well. This was considered the most exciting Brazilian side since 1970.

- Brazil needed just a draw with Italy to reach the Semi-Finals, but fell short. Zico descried the event as "the day Football died." It marked the day that a Formation won over style.

1983 - Coaches were now putting players into a system vs building a system around them.
- Michel Hidalgo in France used Michel Platini as needed. Either a Center Forward, a Regista, in the hole behind a Forward, . . .

1986 - Carlos Bilardo led Argentina through the World Cup.

- With many teams playing without Wingers at the time, he decided to buck the trend of four at the back and create a 3-5-2. This was a system his team had practiced for a couple years before Bilardo was forced to break it out in 1984 to save is job.

- Germany in 1990 and Croatia in 1998 played this formation with much more defensive Wingers, essentially using a 5-3-2, . . . completing the inversion of the 2-3-5 Pyramid (the book is named for).

- Wilson details Argentina's run through the World Cup Final, touching on the "Hand of God," Bilardo's anxiety toward Set Pieces, and so on.

1990 - England made it to the Semi-Final in a 3-5-2 before going out on Penalties to West Germany. Germany won the World Cup playing in a 3-5-2.

- As systems became tighter, goals became less frequent. The 1990 World Cup yielded a drastically low number of goals and the 1992 Euros became the breaking point for FIFA to institute rule changes (disallowing a backpass to a Goalkeeper, tackles from behind, etc.)

Chapter 15: THE ENGLISH PRAGMATISM (2)

- 1973 - 1974** - "The Boot Room" was developed at Anfield as essentially a database / library for Liverpool coaches to save and share ideas after being eliminated from the European Cup by Red Star Belgrade.
- They declared the old fashioned Stopper / Center-Half was no longer in the way, they needed to find Defenders who can play.
 - No more dribbling into the opposing half with no support. They wanted players to have two people to pass to every time they got the ball.
 - They developed a patient, Passing- Game.
- * All of this while most of England was promoting a "Kick and Rush" style.

- 1977** - Graham Taylor was appointed Manager of Watford (by Elton John). From the 4th division, John gave him five years to get the team into European competition.
- They were promoted in 1978, again in 1979 and went into the top division in 1982. They finished second the next season.
 - They played a high tempo, pressing style. They were very direct, . . . Taylor believing: "We couldn't defend our way into Europe." Their Wide Defenders attacked and Wingers pushed high up the field. Their 4-4-2 sometimes resembled a 4-2-4. They even sometimes played in a 3-4-3.



- * Wilson departs from the story of Watford to cover Wimbledon's rise, through physical / kick and rush play, . . . "promotion at all costs."

- 1983** - This season was the first for Watford in European play and the period Taylor realized his direct style of play. He found teams to sit deep, play short passes and keep possession, etc. He even recognized the fans weren't expecting his opponents to play the ball forward quickly. The teams he faced were able to keep the ball, even under the pressure his side applied and when the climate made it difficult to press, his style really suffered.

- * Wilson now goes into the challenge of describing the relationships of Graham Taylor, Charles Hughes and Charles Reep. There were many exchanges of information connecting the Managers, including some that bothered the another. The contentious nature of the ties however show the roots of Match Performance Analysis, or Match Analysis.

- * This is where the concept of nine opportunities being necessary to score a goal began as well as Reep's concept of "Reachers" - balls that land in the final third.

- 1990** - Charles Hughes published *The Winning Formula: Soccer Skills and Tactics*. Based on the findings above, Hughes asserted: "The strategy of direct play is far preferable to that of Possession Football."
- With Hughes the Director of Education and Coaching for the FA from 1983 to 1994, this mindset paved the way for English Football at the time.
 - He also states: "The reason for the decline in goals scored lies not in new efficient defensive strategies so much as a misguided attacking strategy, that of possession football."

- * Wilson spends the next few pages questioning Hughes' statistics and how his ideas were able to define the sport in England for so long.
- * Now the focus becomes centered on the English influence of the game in Scandinavian countries.
 - * Switzerland, won Gold at the 1948 Olympics, finished 3rd at the 1950 World Cup and went out in the final in 1958 (playing in a W-M, with man-marking). They finished 5th in the 1974 World Cup playing with a German-style Libero.
 - 1972** - Bobby Houghton was appointed Player-Manager of Madison United. He hired (As Player-Coach), Roy Hodgson.
 - The two used a zonal defence, pressed and held a high line of defense, and counterattacked with long balls behind opposing defences.
 - 1978** - Sweden finished last in their group at the World Cup and the failure was blamed on what Wilson called "the corrosive nature of the English style." This was emphasized by a reminder that England had not qualified for the tournament.
 - 1980** - Sweden failed to qualify for the European Cup Finals and the SvFF made a formal declaration that the English Style would not be played by the national team and was not to be taught in their national institutions.
 - Enter, Sven Göran Eriksson, who had observed Bobby Robson as part of his coach education. He took over Gothenburg in 1979 and eventually won a league and UEFA Cup double (1982). This set the English 4-4-2 solidly in place.
 - * Norway, was influenced heavily in the 1960s and 70s by Charles Hughes and Alan Wade (who educated Hughes and Hodgson as Technical Director of the FA).
 - 1981** - Egil Olsen (16 Caps for Norway) lectured at the Norwegian University of Sport and Physical Education spoke to revised version of Wade's model. He contended Wade had undervalued the importance of "penetration." He backed the idea that is was more important to penetrate an opposing defense than to focus on possession.
 - His Master's Thesis asserted a team was more likely to score from movements started by an opposing Goalkeeper than from their own. He believed the position of the ball was more important than possession.
 - 1990** - Olsen was appointed National Team Manager where he employed a 4-5-1 with Jostein Flo as Target.
 - He convinced Norwegian fans to buy into the idea of "Chances." When the Norwegian Team drew with Finland in 1997 during World Cup Qualification, fans were appeased by the fact that Norway had created more chances (at a rate of 9 to 2).

Chapter 16: THE COACH WHO WASN'T A HORSE

- 1987** - Arrigo Sacchi brought Zonal-Marking to Italy after Luis Vincio tried at Napoli in 1974 and Nils Liedholm tried at Roma in the early 80s.
- * Arrigo Sacchi grew up fascinated by Honved, Real Madrid, Brazil and the 1970s Dutch team. He was not a player capable of playing professionally, but developed clear ideas of how the game should be played. Growing up and beginning his coaching career during a time of Sweepers and man-marking, he wanted to study what players out of possession did and attack based on more than the creativity of a #10.

- * He grew to believe “if you want to go down in history you don’t just need to win, you have to entertain.
- * Jorge Valdano has similar thoughts:
 - * “Coaches have come to view games as a succession of threats and thus fear has contaminated their ideas. At the heart of football’s great power of seduction is that there are certain sensations that are eternal. What a fan feels today thinking about the game is at the heart of what fans felt fifty or eighty years ago. Similarly, what Ronaldo thinks when he receives the ball is the same as what Pelé thought.”
 - * “People often say, . . . ten years down the line, the only thing which will be remembered is the score, but that’s not true. The Dutch Football teams of the 1970’s are legendary, far more than West Germany, who beat them in the World Cup Final in 1974, or Argentina, who defeated them in the 1978 Final. It’s about the search for perfection. We know it doesn’t exist, but it’s our obligation towards Football, and, maybe, towards humanity to strive towards it. That’s what we remember. That’s what’s special.”

1979 - Sacchi began working with the youth team at Cesena, making £5,000 a year, which was nearly what he made each month as a director in his father’s factory. Sacchi wasn’t into coaching to make money.

Early 1980s - Sacchi was named Youth Coach at Fiorentina, then took the managing position at Parma. He won promotion from Serie C1 in his first season allowing just 14 goals in 34 matches (showing an attacking style rooted in sound defence). The following year, Parma came within 3 points of promotion to Serie A, but had beaten Milan in the group phase of Coppa Italia. This drew the attention of Milan owner Silvio Berlusconi.



- Sacchi: “A Manager can only make a difference if he has a club that backs him, that is patient, that gives confidence to the players and that is willing to commit long-term.”

1987 - Sacchi took over at Milan and had to face his most significant challenge to ideas that someone who never played professionally, would never be able to coach professionally.

- Sacchi: “A Jockey, doesn’t have to have been born a horse.”
- At Milan, Sacchi had his team “squeeze” the space between his line of defense and his forward line, employing an aggressive “Offside Trap.” This way, teams who want to play through them had to penetrate three lines in quick succession. He wanted 25 meters between his last Defender and his Center Forward. They had to move up and down the field as a unit. In possession, he wanted five players ahead of the ball, and there always had to be a player wide right and wide left, it didn’t matter who this two were.

1989 - Wilson spends the next few pages breaking down Milan’s European Championship and how they progressed through the tournament.

- Sacchi often played 5 vs 10 to prove five organized players could beat ten disorganized opponents. The game would last ten minutes and the ten players needed to start over from 10 meters inside their own half if they lost possession. He claims the five, never allowed a goal.

- Sacchi declared four points of reference for players defending. They needed to know the location of (1) the ball, (2) the space, (3) the opponent and (4) teammates. They had only to determine which of these four reference points should determine his movement.

- In terms of "Pressing," he felt: "Pressing is not about running and it's not about working hard. It's about controlling space. Our pressing was psychological as much as physical. Our pressing was always collective."

- Sacchi used three types of Pressing: (1) Partial (2) Total and (3) Fake, where Milan used time to rest.

- Sacchi also used "Shadow Play" in training, something he knew was common in England in the 1960s, . . . he put 11 players on the field against no opponent and without a ball, just moving according to where Sacchi stated the ball was.

1991 - Sacchi took over the Italian National Side, but struggled with the limited time to educate and work with players. Although they went out of the 1994 on Penalties in the final, his decision making was in question. Going out of the 1996 Euros in the Group Stage ended his period with the national team.

1996 - Sacchi returned to Milan but was unable to repeat the success he once had there and was forced out before 1998.

Chapter 17: THE TURNING WORLD

* Wilson rapidly runs through the systematic and defensively focused World Cup tournaments of 1990 and 1994 and the 1996 European Champions (Germany) to the natural reaction of teams finding players capable of breaking down tight defensive units and creating excitement again by the 2000 Euros, although Italy clinged to defensive soundness.

* At this point, the author details the development of the modern Playmaker and how the "artistry is to be incorporated into a system."

* Italians use Trequaristas ("three quarters") who play behind the attack and Registas who play deeper.

* Enganche (the "hook") is the term Argentines use for a Playmaker, who plays between the midfield and attack. Ponta de Lanca ("the point of the lance") is an Inside Forward.

* Wilson describes (Juan Roman) Riquelme as the last of the Playmakers. He contends the Playmaker is too easy to mark out of game, especially now with many teams playing two Holding Mids.


* Here Wilson begins to break down the 3-4-1-2 formation and the efforts of Yugoslavia playing with three at the back through the late 1990s and into the 2000s. This part of the book is complicated by the challenging political issues as Yugoslavia broke up in the early 1990s and Croatia split off.

* Croatia played with three at the back until Slaven Bilić took over in 2006, and changed to four at the back.

* Luka Modrić and Niko Kranjčar represent (as of 2008) the new type of Playmaker, the "Fantasista," a natural born Playmaker, but with tactical discipline.

* "The Playmaker belongs to an era of individual battles: if he could overcome his marker, her could make the play. Against a system that allows two men to be deployed against him, he can't. Yes, by deploying two men against the Playmaker the defensive side is potentially creating space for another, but zonal marking is designed to counter precisely that sort of imbalance." - Jonathan Wilson

- * Now Wilson begins to describe the decline of the Back Three.
 - * Nelsinho Baptista (Brazilian Coach) developed software to compare formations against other formations.
 - * Egypt used a 3-5-2 / 3-4-3 to win the 2008 Africa Cup of Nations, but struggled in the Final against Cameroon's 4-2-3-1.
 - * Steve McClaren "acknowledged that three at the back is only effective if the opposition play with two out-and-out Centre-Forwards." He used a 3-5-2 against Croatia in the 2008 Euros for that reason, but it was considerably different for England and they played it poorly.

 - * Now delving into the 4-2-3-1, Wilson explains the natural progression of player dropping deeper to provide cover for Holding Mid who followed an opposing Trequarista who had drifted wide to find space.
 - * During the 1998 World Cup, France (Aimé Jacquet) used a 4-3-2-1 (or Christmas Tree) to allow cover for one of the greatest Playmakers of all time, Zidane, who lacked pace and needed cover behind him. Youri Djorkaeff played beside Zidane with Deschamps, Petit and Karembeu behind them.
 - * AC Milan won the 2006 Champions League in a 4-3-2-1 with Kaká and Clarence Seedorf in front of Regista Andrea Pirlo. Gattuso and Ambrosini played on Pirlo's left and right. Pirlo and Ambrosini were just as comfortable going forward as Seedorf was providing cover when they did.
 - * Sacchi believed the action of finding players to cover for Playmakers is reactionary. He felt the point of tactics is to achieve the multiplying effect on players' abilities.
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- A portrait of Aimé Jacquet, a French football manager, wearing glasses and a dark suit with a tie. He is looking slightly to the right of the camera.
- * This period of 4-2-3-1 and 4-3-2-1 has helped usher out the idea of three bands to define a formation.
 - * Bilic: "There are no lines any more."
 - * Mourinho's Chelsea (2004 - 2007) were challenged when going forward to break out of their lines. They played in a 4-1-2-3 that was sometimes a 4-1-4-1, but was most easily understood as a 4-3-3.

 - * Wilson now describes modern Strikers
 - * Michael Owen, Wilson describes as being a player left behind by tactical evolution. He was capable of scoring a goal out of nothing, an act that could win a game here and there for a team, but he wasn't a strong enough player to allow teams to play good soccer.
 - * Didier Drogba and Emmanuel Adebayor or strong and quick goal-scorers. They're able to battle, but also "capable of finesse."
 - * Thierry Henry and David Villa are goal-scorers but also create chances for others.

 - * Before closing the chapter, Wilson hints at the potential for a 4-6-0 to become popular. Andy Roxburgh and Carlos Alberto Parreira are quoted describing the likelihood of such a progression.
 - * In 2006 / 2007, Roma were playing in a 4-1-4-1 with Francesco Totti as the only Striker, . . . but he is a typical Trequarista.
 - * In 2008, Manchester United used Cristiano Ronaldo, Wayne Rooney, Carlos Tevez, Ryan Giggs (or Nani) in front of two Holding Mids. There was no clear Striker.

Glossary

Carrilero	Shuttling Midfielder, A Central Mid who moves wide (Argentina)
Catenaccio	“Chain,” . . . as in to chain (lock) a door shut.
Enganche	The “Hook,” a Playmaker, between the midfield and attack (Argentina)
Fantasia	Natural born Playmaker, but with tactical discipline
Media Punta	Of two “split Forwards,” The Media Punta sits behind the Central Striker
Ponta de Lanca	“The Point of The Lance” - an Inside Forward (Argentina)
Regista	Play and create from deeper (Italy)
Trequarista	“Three Quarters” - Plays behind the attack (Italy)